Interview : Vernon Smith by Aaron Steelman
RF: You majored in engineering in college. Why
did you make the switch to economics?
Smith: When I was a senior at CalTech, I took
an economics course and I got interested in the
topic. I went to the library, and among other
things, I ran across a copy of Paul Samuelson’s
Foundations of Economic Analysis. It looked to me a
lot like physics, which I was already doing. I also
subscribed to the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
and in one of the first issues there was an article
by Hollis Chenery on engineering production
functions — so it was engineering too! Little did
I know that that was a very unrepresentative issue
of the journal. But, in general, the discipline was
mathematical and had an important applied
empirical dimension, which appealed to me.
I then went on to the University of Kansas,
where I received my master’s degree. One of my
best teachers there was Richard Howey, who was
an expert in the history of economic thought. I
learned what deep scholarship was from him and
developed an appreciation of where economics
was coming from in the 18th and 19th centuries.
From there, I went to Harvard, where I did my
Ph.D. Among my teachers at Harvard was Gott-
fried Haberler, who warned us of the dangers of
inflation. It was, as Joseph Schumpeter called it,
“ze monster.”
RF: In addition to changing disciplines, you also
changed worldviews. You entered college as a
socialist, right?
Smith: Yes, I grew up in a socialist family. My
mother was a socialist and was very proud that
she had cast her first vote for president for Eugene
Victor Debs. I held many of those views also. But
gradually, as I developed a deeper understanding
of economics, I began to rethink things. And the
final blow came when I started doing experiments
and my subjects taught me that markets work.
That transition took place over a number of years
and became stronger and stronger. Certainly by
the time I had been at Purdue for five or six years
— this would be in the early 1960s — I had
changed my mind.
RF: You had been on many economists’ short
list for the Nobel Prize for some time. Were
you surprised to finally get the call last year?
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Economic theory is based on several assumptions of
how markets work and people behave. Vernon Smith
has spent his career testing those assumptions in the
laboratory. The result is the burgeoning field of “experi-
mental economics.”
Experimental economists observe people’s actions in
controlled environments to determine, among other
things, how and why markets react to changes in legal
and regulatory rules. The insights drawn from such
simulated market transactions can be applied to a num-
ber of issues, including financial market theory, natural
resource economics, and the deregulation of industry.
In 2001, Smith joined the faculty of George Mason
University in Fairfax, Va., where he directs the
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES).
And last year, he and Daniel Kahneman of Princeton
University were jointly awarded the Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Sciences. This made Smith George
Mason’s second Nobel Prize economist: James
Buchanan took home the award in 1986 for his pioneer-
ing work in the field of Public Choice economics.
Smith, 76, heads a team of seven researchers at ICES,
all of whom came with him from the University of
Arizona, where he taught for 25 years. Aaron Steelman
interviewed Smith at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond on January 27, 2003.
Vernon
SmithSmith: I have been hearing rumors about the
Nobel Prize for 20 years. In 1997, for instance, I
was called by someone from Reuters, who told me
that he had it on good authority that I would be
awarded the prize that year, and it would be
announced the following Sunday. I said, “Well, they
don’t announce the awards on Sunday.” But clearly
I had been getting some nominations since the
early 1980s, and my friends all thought that I was
poised to receive the prize. So, after a while, you
get pretty thick skinned about it all and just try to
do your work. The only thing that made this year
any different was that in 2001 the committee had
a symposium on experimental economics in Stock-
holm. They invited 12 of us to be the main speak-
ers and 12 people to discuss those papers. There
was speculation they were going to pick somebody
out of that group, but we couldn’t be sure who it
was or if it would be multiple people.
RF: George Mason University has a reputation for
being a haven for free-market academics. What,
in your view, has contributed to the development
of this relatively unique intellectual environment? 
Smith: I don’t know that much about the history
of George Mason. But I think a pretty crucial
factor was that they were able to attract Jim
Buchanan, who, in turn, attracted other Public
Choice economists to the faculty and graduate
students who wanted to work with them. In addi-
tion, they have a number of excellent Austrian
School economists who have strong free-market
views. Also, I think the administration realized
that they couldn’t be like Harvard, Yale, Chicago,
and other major research universities. So they
needed to find a niche to become well known. But
I really can’t give you a complete answer to that
question. The topic would make for an interest-
ing historical study.
RF: When you came to George Mason, you
brought several faculty members from the Uni-
versity of Arizona along with you. In a way, this
isn’t surprising: Many academics benefit from
working with colleagues with similar interests.
But is this particularly true in the case of exper-
imental economics? Is there something about
the nuts and bolts of actually doing the experi-
ments that requires a core group of researchers?
Smith: Many contributions to economics are made
by lone wolves. That is, there
are an awful lot of papers with
single authors, much more so
than in the hard sciences. For
instance, you can find papers
in Science and Nature that will
have 100 authors. I think
experimental economics lends
itself far more to that type of
approach. Certainly, it’s always
helpful if you have a certain
mass of people to talk to, but
here the actual problems of
covering the operations and
doing the work require multi-
ple skills that often aren’t
embodied in one person. I feel
that a really important part of
my development with experi-
mental economics occurred
when I was no longer working
alone. That started in the
1970s with Charlie Plott, Ross
Miller, and other people at
CalTech. And by the time I
arrived at the University of
Arizona in 1975, most of the
efforts were joint. 
RF: How was your work
received by the profession
when you first started con-
ducting experiments?
Smith: Not particularly well. I first started giving
seminars in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and at
the time people didn’t know what I was doing or
why I was doing it. It didn’t look like economics
to them. But I found it very interesting and excit-
ing, and I was careful enough to do other things
in the meantime to get promoted. 
RF: Tell us about the relationship between
experimental economics and public policy.
Smith: I should say that we don’t set out to do policy
research or to answer policy questions. We’re inter-
ested in the performance and function of markets,
and that often gets you into policy questions.
The first problem that we addressed, after we
got into computerized experiments, was the ques-
tion of how you might design a market for airport
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We  have examples where
people don’t do as well as
rational models predict. 
We  have examples where they






























Daccess rights. In the late 1970s, the deregulation
of the airline industry began. This involved the
routes that airlines could fly and the prices they
could charge. But nobody was thinking about the
airports, where, of course, airplanes have to land
and take off. If access to the airports were going
to continue to be allocated by some bureaucratic
organization, then the airline industry in a sense
wasn’t really being deregulated. 
Take-off and landing slots are a commodity that
have greater value in packages than in singles,
because for every take-off, you have to have a
landing, and the flight schedules need to be com-
patible. We saw this early on as a combinatorial
problem. So we designed an auction mechanism
to try to solve this problem and tested it in the
laboratory. Much later, of course, combinatorial
auctions became of interest to people who were
thinking about how to allocate rights to the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum.
RF: Your Nobel lecture seemed to draw heavily
upon the work of F. A. Hayek, especially his
ideas about rationality. Briefly talk about the dif-
ference between “constructivist rationality” and
what you have termed “ecological rationality.”
Smith: Economic theory is dominated by con-
structivist models, involving optimal knowledge
for individuals, equilibrium in markets, and effi-
ciency. But what we observe in experiments and
the real world is often different: people’s knowl-
edge is incomplete, and they may not have any
idea what it means to talk about equilibrium and
supply and demand. Remarkably, though, the first
time I got people together in the lab, the market
they formed converged toward a competitive equi-
librium. And I think that the history of experi-
mental economics is, to some extent, the story of
people achieving these outcomes that are unin-
tended and unknown to them. This type of knowl-
edge is what I call “ecological rationality.” It may
or may not correspond to the rational model that
constructivism posits. We have examples where
people don’t do as well as rational models predict.
We  have examples where they do better. And we
are trying to understand why. 
All of our work is driven by the notion that
information is fundamentally asymmetric, dis-
persed, not knowable by any one person or group
— and that it is the guy out there with the knowl-
edge who needs to be motivated to reveal what is
necessary to make the system efficient. And this,
of course, is very close to what Hayek argued.
Hayek was incredibly good at the abstract level,
but people read him and have a hard time relat-
ing to him because there are few concrete exam-
ples. In fact, I became influenced by Hayek only
recently, and I now see certain themes that could
integrate a lot of the work in experimental eco-
nomics. My Nobel lecture was sort of the begin-
ning of that project.
RF: What do you see as the relationship between
game theory and experimental economics?
Smith:There has been a lot of experimental eco-
nomics research concerned with testing proposi-
tions from game theory. When it works, game
theorists love it. When it doesn’t work, they have
a tendency to say that there is something wrong
with the experiments. So we make some modifi-
cations to try to explain those anomalies—for
instance, why Dutch auction prices are lower than
first-price sealed-bid auction prices, though game
theory predicts that they are identical. We had
two models, and one did a much better job of
explaining it than the other one. So I guess the
answer is, we have to do it ourselves. I would like
to see a little more division of labor. They are the
experts in game theory, after all. 
But, recently, we have collaborated with some
sympathetic game theorists, and it turns out that
they are the very best in their field. John Ledyard
at CalTech and David Kreps and Bob Wilson at
Stanford have been very sympathetic. Wilson has
even tackled the very important and difficult issue
of doing a game-theoretic analysis of the double
auction. It takes someone like Bob to pass up the
temptation of picking all the low apples and going
for a high one instead. And in his paper he points
out the very serious limitations of his own results
and that the limitations are inherent in the game-
theoretic framework. It takes great courage,
honesty, and intelligence to make such a claim.
RF: There is an emerging school of thought
called “behavioral finance,” according to which
investors display certain predictable cognitive
biases that can lead to significant deviations
between the behavior of actual markets and the
predictions of models with frictionless markets.
Some even say that these biases can explain dra-
matic stock market runups like we had in the
late 1990s. Does your experimental work shed
light on this issue?
Smith:The explanations of the behavioral finance
theorists are certainly possible. But I’m not pre-
pared to say that these markets or their partici-
pants are irrational. And, by the way, neither is
Daniel Kahneman. As far as Danny is concerned,
that’s the behavior and he’s just reporting it. He
doesn’t really make a judgment. 
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this behavior irrational is that, while it may not
be good for the individual, it may be good for
society as a whole. Maybe we are programmed to
do some very risky things in an effort to get back
in the game — and, in so doing, that behavior may
produce benefits for society. We know that people
tend to throw money at innovations and new
entrants to the market, and so we have people
bidding up the price of companies with no net
profits. Many, maybe most, of those companies
will fail. But a few will survive and throw off huge
benefits for the economy, benefits that far exceed
the money that was spent to get them off the
ground. Consider the steam engine. It produced
the steam ship and the locomotive, which were
big drivers of reducing transaction costs and
increasing the speed of things. We spanned a con-
tinent with rail in very little time. Well, many indi-
vidual investors lost money, but there was
long-term value created. The 19th century was an
incredible growth century. And for all I know this
risky, speculative behavior is the cost of that kind
of growth. If I had a formula to protect individ-
uals from their own tomfoolery, it would not nec-
essarily be best for society. I can’t be sure of that.
RF: Some observers have described your exper-
imental work as showing that markets often
misfunction, because in experiments prices
often deviate from “fundamental” values.
Others say your work is broadly supportive of
the efficiency of market mechanisms, because
prices exhibit a strong tendency to clear the
market. Which is it: Do markets work well or
do they often misfunction?
Smith: I distinguish between consumer markets
and asset markets. With the asset markets, we
often get bubbles and crashes in the laboratory,
but the consumer markets tend to converge
quickly. The asset markets eventually get there also,
but it takes longer. We sometimes have to bring
subjects back three times before they will quit
trading away from fundamental value. So there is
confirmation of ultimate fundamental value
trading, but under conditions that are hard to
imagine actually occurring, except for very stable
companies. The distinction between consumer
markets and asset markets is very important. If
people don’t make that distinction, they can get
confused about what my work shows.
RF: What do you think is the most pressing issue
in economics today?
Smith: I think economists’ work is still colored
too much by their political preferences. You know,
Hayek once wrote a paper called “Why I Am Not
a Conservative.” I sometimes would like to write
a paper about why I’m not a conser-
vative or a liberal or a libertarian, so
that I could state what I think the
problems are with all of them.
It’s important for economists to
understand the phenomena they are
studying before they start asking
what can be done about it. And it
seems to me that a lot of people are
afraid of getting certain empirical
results because of the implications it
might have for the policies they
favor. You see this in particular in the
resistance to even the slightest sug-
gestion that some of our behavior
may have an inherited component.
You have people like Steve Pinker
who are talking about both the envi-
ronment and heredity, and yet they
are accused of being genetic deter-
minists, when of course the alterna-
tive is just plain environmental
determinism. It amazes me how
much people are still arguing over
nature versus nurture, when it seems
clear to me that it’s both.
RF: Some economists have done
tremendous technical work but
have not been particularly inter-
ested in reaching people outside the
profession. Others have had the
desire — and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, the skill — to do high-quality
work and make it accessible for lay
audiences. What, in your view,
should be the role between the
economist and the public?
Smith: I think every economist
should ask himself the brother-in-law
test: Can I explain to my brother-in-
law, who is in a completely different
field, what it is that I do for a living? The physi-
cists try to do this. Some are better than others,
but they try to explain what is implied by quantum
physics or by relativity. And over the years, I think
their ways of explaining these issues have improved.
There are an awful lot of people out there who
don’t have a lot of education but who are smart
and want to know things. For example, my
parents had an eighth-grade education, but they
were always curious. We ought to try to reach
these people. RF
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Vernon Smith
➤ Present Position
Professor of Law and Economics,
George Mason University
➤ Previous Faculty Appointments
University of Arizona, California
Institute of Technology, University of
Massachusetts, Brown University, 
Purdue University
➤ Education
B.S.E.E., California Institute of
Technology (1949); M.A., University
of Kansas (1952); Ph.D., Harvard
University (1955)
➤ Awards and HonoraryPositions
Co-winner, 2002 Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Sciences;
Distinguished Fellow, American
Economic Association; Fellow,
American Academy of Arts and
Sciences
➤ Selected Publications
Author of more than 200 articles in
scholarly journals, some of which
are collected in Bargaining and
Market Behavior: Essays in
Experimental Economics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000)
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